Sand- and watergames from AQMI

[Richard Washington]

The raindays from 2009.....
It looks like July 18th was the big one.

[Richard Washington]

and the rest from 2009....

[Richard Washington]

Originally Posted by priffe

If MBM and the others are attacked, they will defend their business interests more than the land.
None of the guys on the video look touareg to me.

We might be talking past each other a bit here.
As for making a stand: where else does this gang have to go to? Seems to me they will fight for the patch. Their business is where they are, so although it might not be their land historically, there are not so many places they can operate from, notwithstanding the size of the Sahara. NE Mali is pretty much perfect for them. The Air is not a bad second.

Sure, the guys are not Touaregs. But they have married locally and recruited locally, so I read.

Suppose AQIM were set up in a base in the middle of the Sahara where there was no other population. Under these conditions a raid on them would be more straightforward. But from what I understand, they hang out fairly close to Touaregs (recall the Austrains escaped and managed to come across some locals - who refused to help and turned them in). A crucial task of any counter insurgency raid is therefore to differentiate who is whom. In the heat of an attack this is more or less impossible. Any raid that goes in and takes out the local population by mistake is only making things harder on themselves next time. AQIM will know all this. So the longer AQIM are there, and the more embedded they become, the harder it will be to dislodge them.

[Chris Scott]

Although it might help, I must say the explanation - we cant take them out because they've become too integrated - does not sound adequate to me. Since when do Mali military care about Iforhas Tuareg any more than Niger govt cares about Aïr Tuareg? Certainly NE Mali is an ideal location and they have few other places to go.

IMO it's come to be a lucrative business arrangement involving all parties - that's why the situation endures. And your Op Flintlock is just window dressing, possibly to justify US Africom. Any news of the new command centre in Tam?

As for a distinctive Tuareg look, there isn't one in my experience - it's as often cultural as ethnic; the smiley guy who points a gun at the camera looked a lot like a Tuareg tour op I know.

It's as likely young Tuareg men are drawn to AQIM as any others from Maghreb or Sahel. With the collapse in tourism and hostile southern govts, they dont have that many choices.

Ch

[priffe]

Flood that destroyed Agadez was in early September. I had email telling excitedly how the desert was green even as their adobe walls came a-tumbling down. http://www.horizonsunlimited.com/hub...ez-niger-45094
but the pics could be taken anytime June-September I reckon.
Some of them have been rooted in Tessalit-Kidal but they are looking to expand into Mauretania-Niger-Nigeria. Ennahar Online - Threat of an alliance between AQIM and "Taliban" of Nigeria
Wherever government is weak and they can recruit some support by their ideology.
The guys in the video speak Arabic dialects suggesting they come from Morocco, Algeria, Mauretania and Tunisia.
I don't think many touaregs or other Saharians/Sahelians are tempted to join the forces. But they are tempted by the drug and kidnapping money. They also believe they have a traditional right to a share if it takes place on their territory.
As for touareg looks, I agree they really can look a Frenchman to an Arab to a black African and anything in between.Still the guys in the video look arabic to me.

And they are estimated to be some four hundred strong. With a handful of leaders. What if - what if a few of the leaders were targeted and taken out? Then what?
And the surprising gathering we see in the video would have been a good time to attack, no?

[Richard Washington]

Originally Posted by Chris Scott

Although it might help, I must say the explanation - we cant take them out because they've become too integrated - does not sound adequate to me. Ch

I agree. Then I don't think it is being floated as an explanation by the Malian govt or any other forces in the region. The real reason nothing has happened is bound up in widespread inefficiencies and poor levels of capability in the region.

It sometimes feels like the community here is more bothered by the AQIM presence in the Sahara than anyone else. The reason I raised the point about local assimilation here was that when who-evers forces finally come round to having a go at AQIM, it will have become harder to dislodge AQIM as a result of their assimilation and familiarity with their surrounds. Its been 7 years now that they are in NE Mali.

In that sense my comment was more a prediction of how hard it will be than an explanation of why nothing seems to have happened. One tactic on the part of AQIM under the conditions of a known raid would simply be to bury everything and bomb-shell off into the local community that they seem now to be mates with- and lie low there. Who does the raiding party shoot then? Everyone in the hills of NE Mali? The tactic wont work for the MBM & co, but these guys will already have found themselves a quiet spot that is well out of reach.

[priffe]

Originally Posted by Richard Washington

It sometimes feels like the community here is more bothered by the AQIM presence in the Sahara than anyone else.

It may seem so, but I believe local support for Aqmi is minimal, and they would be ousted from the desert in short order if they weren't protected by those who gain from their activities. They have bought their support. From locals, from Bamako and Niamey and likely also from north of the border.
I also believe that touaregs not least in Kidal region are those most anxious to throw them out. If it appears otherwise it is because the touaregs have other and even bigger gripes with both Bamako/Niamey and the French. But most people have lost and not gained from the Aqmi presence.

The Aqmi guys are not only propagators of kidnapping but also victims of their own game. It appears one Mauretanian was not the cat but the mouse when he was kidnapped north of Timbouctoo and turned in to the authorities. The cat in this case was an arab narcotrafficante who was supposedly paid 322M CFA by the Mauri/Alg for trying to round up islamists. Then he was in his turn the mouse after Aqmi responded by kidnapping him in Inhalid in broad daylight(anyone familiar with this place that seems to be a center for trafficking of vehicles and humans?).
And he is now said to have confessed to his "dirty deeds" on video on islamist sites.
This what I hear from the Kidal grapevine.

[Chris Scott]

kidnapping him in Inhalid ... anyone familiar with this place that seems to be a center for trafficking of vehicles and humans?

A story from 2004 here, though hard to pin down a location:
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/25/ne...ed3_.html?_r=1

I wonder if that's the same as Ikhalil, just inside Mali a few miles south of Bordj Moktar. (Zoom right in and you see it).

In 2006 we stayed there on two occasions. What's left of my Hilux is still rotting at Ikhalil. On those occasions it looked like a semi-abandoned smuggling trading post, a series of walled compounds that seemed to have recently been left to its own devices by Malian officials. Stuff passes out blatantly from Bordj. Back then we had the impression it was tolerated contraband-lite; cigs, fuel, sugar, etc, bound for Timbuktu and occasionally raided by the Algies. Maybe not.



They have bought their support. From locals, from Bamako and Niamey and likely also from north of the border.

And in case we forget, that is why travel in the Sahara has become dodgy for the likes of us. Otherwise it would just be regional organised crime, easily avoided by 'civilians'.

Ch

[priffe]

Hmmm...seems Ikhalil/Halid/Inhalid is the same place.

Going from there to Tessalit and onwards unharmed seem a real challenge these days-

I also just realized we came within miles of the purported AQ camp when we drove Timiaouine-Kidal last year
(good thing we didn't know)

[priffe]

Since MBM has been spotted here again is a portrait of him from last year

single - The Jamestown Foundation[tt_news]=34964

Mokhtar Belmokhtar: The Algerian Jihad’s Southern Amir
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 12May 8, 2009 09:25 AM Age: 1 yrs
By: Andrew Black

Mokhtar Belmokhtar

Suspected of a leading role in the kidnapping of the two Canadian and two European hostages released on April 21, the enigmatic Mokhtar Belmokhtar has yet again come to the fore as the dominant jihadi personality in the Sahara. Dubbed the “Uncatchable” by French intelligence in 2002, Belmokhtar has operated as a critical facilitator and amir of the Sahara and Sahel regions for Algerian groups including the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA), the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). With eighteen years of involvement in jihadism, Belmokhtar has continually eluded government efforts to marginalize him while becoming a gravitational force in the North African arena and at times a key node in al-Qaeda’s international network. Falsely reported to have been killed by Algerian forces in 1999 (Al-Majallah, March 14, 1999), rumored to be in amnesty negotiations for over two years, and at odds with AQIM amir Abdelmalek Droukdel, Mokhtar Belmokhtar has become detached from the Algerian jihad and is pursuing his own vision of jihad in the Sahara.

Entrée into Jihadism

Born on 1 June 1972 in Ghardaïa, central Algeria, Belmokhtar claims to have entered into jihadism at the age of 19. [1] In an interview posted online in late 2005, Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khaled Abou al-Abbas and Lâaouar - ‘one-eyed’) - professes to have been enamored by the Afghan jihad throughout his secondary schooling. He points to the killing of Jordanian-Palestinian jihad ideologue Abdullah Azzam in 1989 as a seminal point in his development. Within two years of Azzam’s death, Belmokhtar traveled to Afghanistan at the age of 19 where he underwent training at Khalden, Jihad Wal, and al-Qaeda’s Jalalabad camp. While there, Belmokhtar claims to have made connections with jihadis from around the world, including luminaries such as Abu Qatada, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Abu Talal al-Masri. Moreover, Belmokhtar claims to have been to battlefronts “from Qardiz to Jalalabad to Kabul.” While little is known of Belmokhtar’s time in Afghanistan aside from his own account, the training and experience Belmokhtar acquired there would later serve as an essential foundation for his activities in Algeria.

Departing Afghanistan in late 1992 and returning to Ghardaïa in 1993, Belmokhtar soon joined the ranks of the budding jihadi movement in Algeria. His return to Algeria came roughly one year after the Algerian military nullified the 1992 election victory by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which served as the beginning of Algeria’s bloody civil war. Soon after his return, Belmokhtar established the first cell of the Shahada Katibat [Martyrs’ Battalion] in Ghardaïa, which would later expand its operational scope to the Sahara region and become integrated into the GIA as the group’s ninth zone of operations (Al-Majallah, March 14, 1999).

As the GIA grew increasingly violent under the leadership of Jamal Zitouni and Antar Zouabri, Belmokhtar followed Hassan Hattab in forming the GSPC (Le Quotidien d'Oran, November 13, 2002). In the new organization, Belmokhtar continued in his leadership of the southern zone, with an increasing focus on the procurement of weapons and material. Throughout this period, Belmokhtar and those under his command became a dependable supplier of weapons and material to GSPC elements in the north (Le Quotidien d'Oran, November 13, 2002). Nevertheless, Belmokhtar and his el-Moulathamine (Masked) Brigade still conducted periodic attacks against the Algerian security services and even private companies, projecting sufficient force to have a significant influence on the Sahara and Sahel regions. For example, Belmokhtar’s cadre forced the diversion of the 1999 Paris-Dakar rally to avoid the Niger stage (Le Quotidien d'Oran, November 13, 2002). In later years, Belmokhtar would turn his attention to Mauritania, where an estimated 100 to 150 militants under his command would attack Mauritania’s Lemgheity barracks, killing 15 Mauritanian soldiers and wounding another 17 (see Terrorism Focus, June 13, 2005).


Belmokhtar Becomes Detached

A turning point for Belmokhtar and his role in the Algerian jihad would come in 2003 with the replacement of Hassan Hattab as the leader of the GSPC. From this point forward, Belmokhtar appears to have become steadily detached from the mainstream GSPC, turning his attention toward consolidating his powerbase in the southern regions and strengthening his connections with local networks. In 2003, although a senior member of the GSPC and possessing strong militant and leadership credentials, Belmokhtar was not selected to become the GSPC’s next amir. The role was filled instead by Nabil Sahraoui, who would later be killed in a shootout with Algerian security services in June 2004. Although Hassan Hattab would publicly assert his control over the GSPC, leadership of the group passed from Sahraoui to the little known and inexperienced Abdelmalek Droukdel (see Terrorism Focus, November 14, 2005).

According to Abdelkader Benmessaoud, the former leader of AQIM’s Zone 9 who surrendered to authorities in 2007, Belmokhtar split with Droukdel over the latter’s ascent to the leadership of the GSPC (El Watan [Algiers], August 15, 2007). According to Benmessaoud, Droukdel was only expected to be a temporary replacement for Sahraoui, but when it became clear that Droukdel would not step down, Belmokhtar removed himself from the organization (El Watan, August 15, 2007). In so doing, Belmokhtar appears to have become a counterbalance to Droukdel’s leadership, even going so far as to criticize Droukdel’s leadership of the organization (Liberté [Algiers], April 1, 2009).

Al-Qaeda’s Bridge to Algeria

After returning from Afghanistan in 1993, Belmokhtar became a key channel for communications between core al-Qaeda and the Algerian jihadi groups. According to his 2005 interview, Belmokhtar claimed to have initiated correspondence with al-Qaeda while the latter was residing in Sudan in the early 1990s. Belmokhtar goes so far as to say that he was tasked with reaching out to al-Qaeda to generate financial and training support for the burgeoning Algerian jihad in late 1994. While al-Qaeda was known to have provided support to other North African groups during this time, it is unclear to what degree al-Qaeda actually supported Belmokhtar (see Jamestown’s Spotlight on Terror, March 21, 2005).

Belmokhtar’s contact with core al-Qaeda would continue through his move from the GIA to the GSPC. In 2002, Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, the director of France’s Territorial Surveillance Directorate (Direction de la surveillance du territoire - DST), noted that al-Qaeda maintained direct lines of communication with Belmokhtar (Le Monde [Paris], September 12, 2002). In his statement, de Florian highlighted French concern over the potential for al-Qaeda to use the GSPC to tap disaffected French citizens of Maghrabi extraction (Le Monde, September 12, 2002). Indeed, core al-Qaeda appears to have also maintained links with the senior GSPC leadership through European networks. One report claimed that in the late 1990s when Hassan Hattab was forming the GSPC, bin Laden assisted Hattab in connecting with the GIA’s European networks through an intermediary in Germany named Mustapha Ait el-Hadi, reported to be a supporter of Belmokhtar (El Watan, October 7, 2002).

Years later, Belmokhtar became the contact for al-Qaeda emissaries to the Algerian arena, starting at least as early as 2002 with Abu Mohamed al-Yemeni (a.k.a. Imad Abdelwahab Ahmed Alwan), a 37-year old Yemeni killed by Algerian troops in the Batna area in September 2002 (Liberté, October 23, 2003). He was reported to have been sent by core al-Qaeda to oversee the development and expansion of the GSPC’s activities (Le Matin [Algiers], November 28, 2002). Following al-Yemeni’s death, al-Qaeda reportedly sent additional emissaries, including Abd-al-Raqib, to liaise with the GSPC’s leadership by way of Belmokhtar (L'Expression [Algiers], January 6, 2003).

The Kingpin in the Sahara

In addition to serving as a key facilitator between Algerian jihadi groups and al-Qaeda, Belmokhtar also became the key supplier of weapons and material in the Sahara region. His ability to supply jihadi elements in northern Algeria reliably has been critical to the ability for these groups to sustain their activities. Over the years that he has operated in this capacity, Belmokhtar has become increasingly integrated into the fabric of the Sahara and Sahel.

To raise funds for his group, Belmokhtar has reportedly engaged in a range of activities, from smuggling cigarettes to levying protection tax on other traffickers traversing the region (Le Quotidien d'Oran, November 13, 2002). These activities earned Belmokhtar distinction and notoriety in counterterrorism communities and several monikers among the local population, including “Mister Marlboro,” reflecting his cigarette smuggling activities (L'Expression, May 19, 2003). As Belmokhtar expanded his activities, detractors argued that his interests had shifted from the Algerian jihad to a focus on self-aggrandizement and profit (Jeune Afrique-L'Intelligent, November 11, 2006).

Key to Belmokhtar’s Saharan activities has been his strong connections with local Tuareg communites. While reporting on these links is scant, Belmokhtar is reported to have married four wives from local Arab and Tuareg communities (L’Aube, April 9, 2009; Le Soir d’Algerie, April 14, 2008). Mali’s Colonel El-Hadj Gamou, an ethnic Tuareg, stated in 2003 that Belmokhtar was granted safe haven by the Tuaregs provided he did not conduct hostilities on Tuareg lands (Le Figaro [Paris], March 19, 2007). Despite these links, Belmokhtar’s cabal has at times engaged in hostilities with Tuareg factions, including Ibrahim Ag Bahanga’s Alliance Démocratique du 23 mai pour le Changement (ADC). For instance, the two sides engaged in a series of skirmishes and targeted killings in October 2006 after Tuareg leaders in the ADC protested GSPC activities in their area (Quotidien d’Oran, October 2006; Reuters, November 2, 2006).

Important to note is that despite his detachment from the GSPC and later AQIM, Belmokhtar appears to remain a critical supplier for the group. In early April 2009, there were reports that Algerian security services skirmished with an el-Moulathamine unit that included Belmokhtar. The cadre were said to have been entering Algeria from Libya on their way to an arms purchase with a Nigerien trafficker named “al-Hadj” (Liberté, April 1).

Hostages and Influence

Perhaps Belmokhtar’s most publicized activities have been his involvement in the 2003 kidnapping of 32 European tourists, the 2008 negotiations for the release of two Austrian hostages, and the 2009 negotiations for the release of two Canadian hostages (El Khabar [Algiers], February 23, 2009). While Belmokhtar played only a secondary role in the 2003 hostage crisis led by Amari Saifi, he was central to the release of the Austrian and Canadian hostages. In all three cases, Belmokhtar was not thought to have taken part in the initial kidnapping, only becoming involved once the hostages had been taken and negotiations initiated.

His role in the negotiations for the release of the Austrians and Canadians indicates Belmokhtar’s formidable position and breadth of interests in the Sahara. For example, in September 2008 Belmokhtar reportedly proposed to swap the Austrian hostages for ransom payment and the release of two Mauritanian prisoners (Kurier [Vienna], September 12, 2008). In 2009, after negotiations for the release of the Canadian hostages had begun, Belmokhtar made a similar suggestion (Liberté, February 8). After acquiring control of the Canadian hostages, Belmokhtar was then in a position to negotiate directly for the Mauritanians’ release (Le Courrier d’Algerie, March 4, 2009).

In the end, Belmokhtar was reportedly able to secure a €5 million ransom payment (from parties that remain undetermined) and the release of a number of militants, including Oussama el-Merdaci (Ennahar, April 28). El-Merdaci is a veteran of Afghanistan who was arrested in 2008 by the Malian security services in Timbuktu as he was heading toward Somalia (Liberté, February 8, 2009; La Nouvelle Patrie, February 16, 2009). Interestingly, el-Merdaci is thought to have been close with Abdelmalek Droukdel (El Watan, March 2, 2008). The fact that in each of these cases the hostages were brought into Mali for negotiations has led to speculation that Belmokhtar maintains senior contacts in the Malian government and military (Liberté, February 8; Ennahar, April 28).

Belmokhtar’s Future

Belmokhtar has been a fundamental element of the Algerian jihad stretching back to 1993, fulfilling key positions as amir for the southern zone, a key supplier of resources, and a point of contact for al-Qaeda. While relations between Belmokhtar and the mainstream AQIM leadership appear frayed, reports of his ongoing efforts to supply elements in the north with weapons and material as well as his sustained contacts with Abdelhamid Abou Zaid Essoufi and Yahia Djouadi indicate Belmokhtar remains connected with AQIM’s ongoing operations.

His future, though, is a source of much speculation. The Algerian government recently claimed to have issued Belmokhtar his final warning to accept their amnesty offer or else he would be eliminated (El-Khabar, April 25). This would not be the first time that the Algerian government has made such threats or claimed to have killed Belmokhtar (Al-Majallah, March 14, 1999). Amnesty negotiations have been rumored to be ongoing for several years through Tamanrasset businessman El-Hadj Bettou (Magharebia, April 28, 2008). In April 2008, Algerian media reported Belmokhtar and 15 of his men had surrendered to authorities, a claim which appears to have been false (Le Courrier d’Algerie, April 9, 2008).

The potential for such an outcome however appears remote. Belmokhtar’s ongoing involvement in weapons trafficking and the 2008 and 2009 hostage crises indicates Belmokhtar is committed to maintaining his current capacity in the Sahara and Sahel regions. As his Tuareg tribal connections appear to remain warm and he reportedly maintains allies in the Malian government, Belmokhtar appears to have successfully woven himself into the fabric of the region.